The role of intermediaries in corruption

被引:4
作者
Güzin Bayar
机构
[1] Middle East Technical University,
来源
Public Choice | 2005年 / 122卷
关键词
Theoretical Model; Public Finance; Public Officer; Reservation Price; Game Theoretical Model;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The aim of the article is to examine a briber initiated corrupt transaction and the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. Clients applying the intermediaries do so to be able to get rid of high red tape applied by the officers. They prefer using intermediary instead of offering a bribe to the officers directly since they do not know which officers are corrupt (accepts a bribe offer) and how much bribe should be given to the corrupt officers.
引用
收藏
页码:277 / 298
页数:21
相关论文
共 17 条
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