Monetary constitution, political-economic regime, and long-term inflation

被引：7

作者：

Bernholz P. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CH-4003 Basel, Postfach

来源：

Constitutional Political Economy | 2001年 / 12卷 / 1期

关键词：

Deficit monetary regime; Government; Inflation;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1016679103390

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Empirical data about inflation in different countries for about two hundred years since 1800 demonstrate the importance of monetary regimes or constitutions as to the long-term inflationary bias of the respective currencies. Regimes binding the hands of government are less inflation-prone than others. This empirical fact is a consequence of political competition inducing governments to favor inflationary monetary policies. © 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：3 / 12

页数：9

共 7 条

[1]

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[2]

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[3]

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[4]

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[5]

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[6]

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[7]

Spinelli F., Fratianni M., Storia Monetaria d'Italia, (1991)

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