Firm reputation with hidden information

被引：7

作者：

Steven Tadelis

机构：

[1] Department of Economics,

[2] Stanford University,undefined

[3] Stanford,undefined

[4] CA 94305-6072,undefined

[5] USA (e-mail stadelis@stanford.edu) ,undefined

来源：

Economic Theory | 2003年 / 21卷

关键词：

JEL Classification Numbers: D80, L14.; Keywords and Phrases: Reputation as an asset, Trade of names, Overlapping generations.;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success and decrease after failure.

引用

页码：635 / 651

页数：16