Game strategies in network security

被引:30
作者
Lye K.-W. [1 ]
Wing J.M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Dept. of Elec./Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
[2] Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
关键词
Network security; Nonlinear programming; Stochastic games;
D O I
10.1007/s10207-004-0060-x
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper presents a game-theoretic method for analyzing the security of computer networks. We view the interactions between an attacker and the administrator as a two-player stochastic game and construct a model for the game. Using a nonlinear program, we compute Nash equilibria or best-response strategies for the players (attacker and administrator). We then explain why the strategies are realistic and how administrators can use these results to enhance the security of their network. © Springer-Verlag 2005.
引用
收藏
页码:71 / 86
页数:15
相关论文
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