All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure

被引：2

作者：

Castillo R. ^{[1
]}

Skaperdas S. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Economics and Statistics, California State University, Los Angeles, CA 90032

[2] Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, Social Science Plaza

来源：

Economics of Governance | 2005年 / 6卷 / 2期

关键词：

Agency costs; Corporate governance; Managerial conflict;

D O I：

10.1007/s10101-005-0103-4

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and shareholders. To counteract this effect the managers/owners increase the share of the firm they retain so that, overall, higher protection of outsiders increases the likelihood of going public. In addition, we examine how the share of funds raised used to finance the firm affects both appropriative costs and the decision to sell. © Springer-Verlag 2005.

引用

页码：93 / 104

页数：11

共 31 条

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