Simultaneous and sequential anticommons

被引：3

作者：

Parisi F. ^{[1
]}

Schulz N. ^{[2
]}

Depoorter B. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] George Mason University, School of Law, Arlington, VA 22201

[2] University of Wuerzburg, Lehrstuhl VWL III, D-97070 Wuerzburg

[3] Yale University-Law School, New Haven, CT 06520-8215

来源：

European Journal of Law and Economics | 2004年 / 17卷 / 2期

关键词：

Anticommons; Commons; Exclusion rights; Hold-ups; Property fragmentation;

D O I：

10.1023/B:EJLE.0000014575.00312.15

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.

引用

页码：175 / 190

页数：15

共 24 条

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