Investor sophistication and voluntary disclosures

被引：5

作者：

Dye R.A. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Department of Accounting and Information Systems, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208

来源：

Review of Accounting Studies | 1998年 / 3卷 / 3期

关键词：

Threshold Level; Selling Price; Individual Investor; Voluntary Disclosure; Investor Sophistication;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1009627506893

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper studies voluntary disclosures in a model in which investors probabilistically become informed about whether a firm has received information. The firm's value is established via a first price, sealed bid, common value auction. The paper demonstrates that the threshold level determining whether the firm withholds or discloses information uniformly declines in the probability investors are informed. The paper also shows that, notwithstanding the risk-neutrality of investors, the expected selling price of the firm strictly decreases (increases) in the probability individual investors are informed when that probability is small (large). These results follow from "winner's curse" effects. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers,.

引用

页码：261 / 287

页数：26

共 16 条

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