Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Simulation, Validation and Social Extensions

被引：35

作者：

Enrico Gerding

David van Bragt

Han La Poutré

机构：

[1] Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI), 1090 GB Amsterdam

[2] School of Technology Management, Eindhoven University of Technology, 5600 MB Eindhoven

来源：

Computational Economics | 2003年 / 22卷 / 1期

关键词：

evolutionary algorithms; fairness; game theory; multi-issue bargaining; multiple bargaining opportunities;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1024592607487

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents are generated by an evolutionary algorithm (EA). The negotiations are governed by a finite-horizon version of the alternating-offers protocol. Several issues are negotiated simulataneously. We first analyse and validate the outcomes of the evolutionary system, using the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium as a benchmark. We then present two extensions of the negotiation model. In the first extension agents take into account the fairness of the obtained payoff. We find that when the fairness norm is consistently applied during the negotiation, agents reach symmetric outcomes which are robust and rather insensitive to the actual fairness settings. In the second extension we model a competitive market situation where agents have multiple bargaining opportunities before reaching the final agreement. Symmetric outcomes are now also obtained, even when the number of bargaining opportunities is small. We furthermore study the influence of search or negotiation costs in this game. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：39 / 63

页数：24

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