On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency

被引:2
作者
Hans Gersbach
机构
[1] Alfred-Weber-Institut, University of Heidelberg, 69117 Heidelberg
关键词
Central banks; Credibility; Disclosure rules; Transparency;
D O I
10.1007/s101010200058
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We examine to what extent central banks should release their internal assessments concerning the links between money growth and future inflation, and between employment and inflation. We show that the social value of knowledge transparency concerning real shocks is negative since the disclosure of the central bank's private information eliminates the possibility of insuring the public against those shocks. Finally, we discuss a number of further arguments which have to be taken into account before policy conclusions can be drawn.
引用
收藏
页码:91 / 102
页数:11
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