Quality and Quantity of Information Exchange

被引：14

作者：

Robert van Rooy

机构：

[1] University of Amsterdam,Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

来源：

Journal of Logic, Language and Information | 2003年 / 12卷 / 4期

关键词：

Gricean pragmatics; meaning; relevance; signaling games;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1025054901745

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

The paper deals with credible and relevantinformation flow in dialogs: How useful is it for areceiver to get some information, how useful is it fora sender to give this information, and how much credibleinformation can we expect to flow between sender andreceiver? What is the relation between semantics andpragmatics? These Gricean questions will be addressedfrom a decision and game-theoretical point of view.

引用

页码：423 / 451

页数：28

共 26 条

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