Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

被引：2

作者：

Lescop D. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CRESE, University of Besançon, 25030 Besancon Cedex

来源：

Review of Economic Design | 2007年 / 10卷 / 4期

关键词：

Auctions; Bayesian equilibrium; Club good; Externalities;

D O I：

10.1007/s10058-006-0018-8

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We study Bayesian mechanism design in the context of the siting of noxious facilities. Under incomplete information, we characterize optimal mechanisms facilitating the siting and cost sharing of the facility. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomenon disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric. © Springer-Verlag 2007.

引用

页码：273 / 284

页数：11

共 14 条

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