A FURTHER NOTE ON THE STABLE MATCHING PROBLEM

被引：35

作者：

DEMANGE, G

GALE, D

SOTOMAYOR, M

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,DEPT MATH,BERKELEY,CA 94720

[2] PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA RIO DE JANEIRO,BR-20000 RIO DE JANEIRO,RJ,BRAZIL

来源：

DISCRETE APPLIED MATHEMATICS | 1987年 / 16卷 / 03期

关键词：

* This author gratefully acknowledges support of the Institut des Hautes Etudes and the Laboratoire d'Econom6trie de l'Ecole Polytechnique; Paris;

D O I：

10.1016/0166-218X(87)90059-X

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

7

引用

收藏

页码：217 / 222

页数：6

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