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VALUES FOR 2-STAGE GAMES - ANOTHER VIEW OF THE SHAPLEY AXIOMS
被引:4
作者
:
BEJA, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
BEJA, A
GILBOA, I
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
GILBOA, I
机构
:
[1]
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
[2]
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JL KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,DEPT MANAGERIAL ECON & DECIS SCI,EVANSTON,IL 60201
来源
:
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
|
1990年
/ 19卷
/ 01期
关键词
:
Majority Games;
Shapley Axioms;
Shapley Values;
Two-Stage Games;
D O I
:
10.1007/BF01753705
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
This short study reports an application of the Shapley value axioms to a new concept of "two-stage games." In these games, the formation of a coalition in the first stage entitles its members to play a prespecified cooperative game at the second stage. The original Shapley axioms have natural equivalents in the new framework, and we show the existence of (non-unique) values and semivalues for two stage games, analogous to those defined by the corresponding axioms for the conventional (one-stage) games. However, we also prove that all semivalues (hence, perforce, all values) must give patently unacceptable solutions for some "two-stage majority games" (where the members of a majority coalition play a conventional majority game). Our reservations about these prescribed values are related to Roth's (1980) criticism of Shapley's "λ-transfer value" for non-transferable utility (NTU) games. But our analysis has wider scope than Roth's example, and the argument that it offers appears to be more conclusive. The study also indicates how the values and semivalues for two-stage games can be naturally generalized to apply for "multi-stage games." © 1990 Physica-Verlag.
引用
收藏
页码:17 / 31
页数:15
相关论文
共 14 条
[1]
ON THE NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE - REJOINDER
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1986,
54
(04)
:985
-989
[2]
ON THE NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE - A COMMENT ON THE ROTH-SHAFER EXAMPLES
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(03)
:667
-677
[3]
AN AXIOMATIZATION OF THE NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(03)
:599
-612
[4]
VALUES OF MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF TRADERS
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1975,
43
(04)
:611
-646
[5]
VALUE THEORY WITHOUT EFFICIENCY
[J].
DUBEY, P
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201
DUBEY, P
;
NEYMAN, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201
NEYMAN, A
;
WEBER, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201
WEBER, RJ
.
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
1981,
6
(01)
:122
-128
[6]
Ford L., 1962, FLOWS NETWORKS
[7]
VALUES FOR GAMES WITHOUT SIDE PAYMENTS - COMMENT
[J].
HARSANYI, JC
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HARSANYI, JC
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1980,
48
(02)
:477
-477
[8]
NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES AND MARKETS - SOME EXAMPLES AND THE HARSANYI SOLUTION
[J].
HART, S
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HART, S
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(06)
:1445
-1450
[9]
AN AXIOMATIZATION OF HARSANYIS NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY SOLUTION
[J].
HART, S
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JL KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,DEPT MANAGERIAL ECON & DECIS SCI,EVANSTON,IL 60201
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JL KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,DEPT MANAGERIAL ECON & DECIS SCI,EVANSTON,IL 60201
HART, S
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(06)
:1295
-1313
[10]
VALUES FOR GAMES WITHOUT SIDEPAYMENTS - SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH CURRENT CONCEPTS
[J].
ROTH, AE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ROTH, AE
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1980,
48
(02)
:457
-465
←
1
2
→
共 14 条
[1]
ON THE NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE - REJOINDER
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1986,
54
(04)
:985
-989
[2]
ON THE NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE - A COMMENT ON THE ROTH-SHAFER EXAMPLES
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(03)
:667
-677
[3]
AN AXIOMATIZATION OF THE NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(03)
:599
-612
[4]
VALUES OF MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF TRADERS
[J].
AUMANN, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
AUMANN, RJ
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1975,
43
(04)
:611
-646
[5]
VALUE THEORY WITHOUT EFFICIENCY
[J].
DUBEY, P
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201
DUBEY, P
;
NEYMAN, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201
NEYMAN, A
;
WEBER, RJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201
WEBER, RJ
.
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
1981,
6
(01)
:122
-128
[6]
Ford L., 1962, FLOWS NETWORKS
[7]
VALUES FOR GAMES WITHOUT SIDE PAYMENTS - COMMENT
[J].
HARSANYI, JC
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HARSANYI, JC
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1980,
48
(02)
:477
-477
[8]
NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES AND MARKETS - SOME EXAMPLES AND THE HARSANYI SOLUTION
[J].
HART, S
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HART, S
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(06)
:1445
-1450
[9]
AN AXIOMATIZATION OF HARSANYIS NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY SOLUTION
[J].
HART, S
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JL KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,DEPT MANAGERIAL ECON & DECIS SCI,EVANSTON,IL 60201
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JL KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,DEPT MANAGERIAL ECON & DECIS SCI,EVANSTON,IL 60201
HART, S
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1985,
53
(06)
:1295
-1313
[10]
VALUES FOR GAMES WITHOUT SIDEPAYMENTS - SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH CURRENT CONCEPTS
[J].
ROTH, AE
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ROTH, AE
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1980,
48
(02)
:457
-465
←
1
2
→