WHY VERSUS HOW OFTEN - CAUSAL REASONING AND THE INCIDENCE OF JUDGMENTAL BIAS

被引：41

作者：

LOCKSLEY, A

STANGOR, C

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-1031(84)90038-6

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：470 / 483

页数：14

共 32 条

[1]

AJZEN I, 1977, J PERSONALITY SOCIAL, V35, P305

[2] THE BASE-RATE FALLACY IN PROBABILITY JUDGMENTS [J].

BARHILLEL, M .

[3]

BARHILLEL M, 1983, INDIVIDUAL DECISION

[4]

Dawes R.M., 1982, JUDGEMENT UNCERTAINT, P391

[5] ROBUST BEAUTY OF IMPROPER LINEAR-MODELS IN DECISION-MAKING [J].

DAWES, RM .

[6] PREDICTION, DIAGNOSIS, AND CAUSAL THINKING IN FORECASTING [J].

EINHORN, HJ ;

HOGARTH, RM .

[7] BEHAVIORAL DECISION-THEORY - PROCESSES OF JUDGMENT AND CHOICE [J].

EINHORN, HJ ;

HOGARTH, RM .

[8]

EINHORN HJ, 1983, DIAGNOSTIC INFERENCE

[9] HYPOTHESIS EVALUATION FROM A BAYESIAN PERSPECTIVE [J].

FISCHHOFF, B ;

BEYTHMAROM, R .

[10]

GOLDBERG LR, 1968, J EXPT RES PERSONALI, V3, P168