POLICY RELATED VOTING AND ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM

[1] ALDRICH JH, 1968, 1973 M AM POL SCIENC

[2] Anderson T.W., 1955, P AM MATH SOC, V6, P170, DOI [10.2307/2032333, DOI 10.2307/2032333]

[3] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[4] Davis OttoA., 1968, PUBLIC CHOICE, V5, P59, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01718684

[5] Grunbaum B, 1967, CONVEX POLYTOPES

[6] NONVOTING AND EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM UNDER MAJORITY RULE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1972, 4 (02) : 144 - 153

[7] PLURALITY MAXIMIZATION VS VOTE MAXIMIZATION - SPATIAL ANALYSIS WITH VARIABLE PARTICIPATION [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (03) : 772 - 791

[8] HINICH MJ, 1969, PUBLIC CHOICE, V7, P79

[9] EXTENSIONS TO A MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES [J]. MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1970, 14 (01): : 43 - 70

[10] Owen G, 1968, GAME THEORY

[1] ALDRICH JH, 1968, 1973 M AM POL SCIENC

[2] Anderson T.W., 1955, P AM MATH SOC, V6, P170, DOI [10.2307/2032333, DOI 10.2307/2032333]

[3] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[4] Davis OttoA., 1968, PUBLIC CHOICE, V5, P59, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01718684

[5] Grunbaum B, 1967, CONVEX POLYTOPES

[6] NONVOTING AND EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM UNDER MAJORITY RULE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1972, 4 (02) : 144 - 153

[7] PLURALITY MAXIMIZATION VS VOTE MAXIMIZATION - SPATIAL ANALYSIS WITH VARIABLE PARTICIPATION [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (03) : 772 - 791

[8] HINICH MJ, 1969, PUBLIC CHOICE, V7, P79

[9] EXTENSIONS TO A MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES [J]. MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1970, 14 (01): : 43 - 70

[10] Owen G, 1968, GAME THEORY