EXCESS FUNCTIONS FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITHOUT SIDEPAYMENTS

被引：15

作者：

KALAI, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TEL AVIV UNIV,DEPT STATISTICS,TEL AVIV,ISRAEL

来源：

SIAM JOURNAL ON APPLIED MATHEMATICS | 1975年 / 29卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1137/0129006

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

A family of excess functions is defined for cooperative n-person nonsidepayment games It is shown that by using these excess functions the epsilon -core, kernel, and nucleolus of a nonsidepayment game can be defined in a way that preserves a significant portion of the structure that these concepts exhibit in the sidepayment case. Some excess functions are extensions of the sidepayment games' ″excesses″ . It is also shown that the set of nucleoli that exist for some excess functions is precisely the set of reasonable (in a core sense) outcomes of a game.

引用

页码：60 / 71

页数：12

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