EFFECT OF RELATIVE DECISION MONITORING ON CHIEF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION

被引：13

作者：

KERR, JL ^{[1
]}

KREN, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV WISCONSIN,SCH BUSINESS ADM,MILWAUKEE,WI 53201

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1992年 / 35卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/256378

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study investigated the effects of relative decision monitoring, whereby decisions are compared to those of competitors, on chief executive officer [CEO] compensation. We tested for both cash compensation [salary plus bonus] and cash-plus-stock-option compensation. The study's premise was that, to the extent boards of directors consider behavioral information in the CEO evaluation process, performance should have a stronger influence on pay when CEO decisions differ from typical industry decisions. Thus, we compared critical strategic decisions of CEOs with the decisions of same-industry competitors. Results indicate that unique decision making significantly moderates the relationship between performance and compensation under some, but not all, conditions.

引用

页码：370 / 397

页数：28

共 48 条

[1]

Alchian A. A., 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P77

[2] MEASURING EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION - METHODS AND AN APPLICATION [J].