STRATEGIC SPILLOVERS IN PATENT RACES

被引：61

作者：

DEFRAJA, G

机构：

[1] University of York, York

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1993年 / 11卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(93)90040-J

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates whether there might exist individual incentives for firms to disclose the scientific knowledge obtained by their laboratories. In plausible conditions, the only non-cooperative equilibrium of the two-firm disclosure game considered is such that both firms do indeed disclose this knowledge. For other parameter combinations the only industry equilibrium is such that one firm discloses its findings, the other keeps them secret.

引用

页码：139 / 146

页数：8

共 9 条

[1]

Beath J., 1989, B ECON RES, V41, P163, DOI DOI 10.1111/J.1467-8586.1989.TB00335.X

[2] SHARING PRODUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNALLY FINANCED RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT CONTESTS [J].

BHATTACHARYA, S ;

GLAZER, J ;

SAPPINGTON, DEM .

JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1990, 39 (02) :187-208

[3] Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R & D [J].

COHEN, WM ;

LEVINTHAL, DA .

ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1989, 99 (397) :569-596

[4] UNCERTAINTY, INDUSTRIAL-STRUCTURE, AND THE SPEED OF R AND D [J].

DASGUPTA, P ;

STIGLITZ, J .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 11 (01) :1-28

[5]

DASPREMONT C, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P1133

[6]

DEFRAJA G, 1990, 283 U BRIST DISC PAP

[7]

Grossman GM, 1986, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V2, P315

[8]

Scherer, 1970, IND MARKET STRUCTURE

[9]

Tirole J., 1988, THEORY IND ORG

← 1 →