WHOSE INTERESTS DO HIRED TOP MANAGERS PURSUE - AN EXAMINATION OF SELECT MUTUAL AND STOCK LIFE INSURERS

被引:27
作者
KROLL, M [1 ]
WRIGHT, P [1 ]
THEERATHORN, P [1 ]
机构
[1] MEMPHIS STATE UNIV,MEMPHIS,TN 38152
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0148-2963(93)90002-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this article theoretical and empirical explorations that have addressed the question, Whose interests do top managers pursue? are synthesized and grouped under two categories. Based on the review of the literature, three propositions are tested on two groups of organizations-mutual insurers and stock insurers. The results of the study lend support the premise that top executives do not necessarily act in the best interests of owners.
引用
收藏
页码:133 / 148
页数:16
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