THE STRATEGY STRUCTURE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS

被引：162

作者：

DEMANGE, G ^{[1
]}

GALE, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1985年 / 53卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912658

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：873 / 888

页数：16

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