A GENERIC APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION

被引：161

作者：

Apt, Krzysztof R. ^{[1
]}

Witzel, Andreas ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] CWI, Sci Pk 123, NL-1098 XG Amsterdam, Netherlands

[2] Univ Amsterdam, ILLC, NL-1018 TV Amsterdam, Netherlands

来源：

INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW | 2009年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

Coalition formation; stable partition; merges and splits;

D O I：

10.1142/S0219198909002352

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TUgames, hedonic games and exchange economy games.

引用

页码：347 / 367

页数：21

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