FARSIGHTED STRONG EQUILIBRIUM AND OLIGOPOLY

被引:6
作者
LI, S
机构
[1] University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(92)90242-Q
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This note introduces a new solution concept: Far-Sighted Strong Equilibrium, and applies it to oligopoly. I show that for the classical oligopoly model, the symmetry joint profit maximization allocation is Far-Sighted Strong Equilibrium of Order One.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 44
页数:6
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