ASSIGNMENT GAMES, CHROMATIC NUMBER, AND EXCHANGE THEORY

被引:12
作者
BONACICH, P
BIENENSTOCK, EJ
机构
[1] Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles
关键词
D O I
10.1080/0022250X.1993.9990110
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
The exchange networks that social psychologists have studied can usefully be represented as game theoretic 2-sided assignment games. Conceiving of these networks as 2-sided assignment games opens up the possibility of studying N-sided assignment games and games without cores. 2-sided assignment games are special in that they always have cores, stable solutions in which every individual and subgroup behave rationally. The implicit assignment of positions to categories of an N-sided assignment game is related to coloring a graph. The color classes form sets of positions with potentially related interests. Color equivalence is compared to structural, regular, automorphic, and ecological positional equivalence.
引用
收藏
页码:243 / 259
页数:17
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