ELECTIONS WITH LIMITED INFORMATION - A FULFILLED EXPECTATIONS MODEL USING CONTEMPORANEOUS POLL AND ENDORSEMENT DATA AS INFORMATION-SOURCES

被引:131
作者
MCKELVEY, RD [1 ]
ORDESHOOK, PC [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV TEXAS,AUSTIN,TX 78712
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:55 / 85
页数:31
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]  
Almond Gabriel., 1989, CIVIC CULTURE REVISI
[2]  
Berelson B. R., 1954, VOTING
[3]  
Converse Philip E., 1975, HDB POLITICAL SCI
[4]  
DAVIS OA, 1968, PUBLIC CHOICE, P59
[5]   FURTHER RESULTS ON INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS [J].
GROSSMAN, S .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1978, 18 (01) :81-101
[6]  
GROSSMAN SJ, 1980, AM ECON REV, V70, P393
[7]   AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].
GROSSMAN, SJ .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1981, 48 (04) :541-559
[8]  
Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[9]  
Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[10]   GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J].
HARSANYI, JC .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) :320-334