RENT SEEKING AND ENTRY

被引：17

作者：

APPELBAUM, E ^{[1
]}

KATZ, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BAR ILAN UNIV,RAMAT GAN,ISRAEL

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(86)90024-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：207 / 212

页数：6

共 9 条

[1]

APPELBAUM E, UNPUB PUBLIC CHOICE

[2] DIRECTLY UNPRODUCTIVE, PROFIT-SEEKING (DUP) ACTIVITIES [J].

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[3] LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN RENT-SEEKING [J].

CORCORAN, WJ .

[4] RISK-AVERSE RENT SEEKERS AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY POWER [J].

HILLMAN, AL ;

KATZ, E .

[5]

KRUEGER AO, 1974, AM ECON REV, V64, P291

[6] SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND REGULATION [J].

POSNER, RA .

TULLOCK, G .

[8]

TULLOCK G, 1967, WESTERN ECON J, V5, P224

[9]

Tullock G., 1980, THEORY RENT SEEKING