THE CENTRAL ASSIGNMENT GAME AND THE ASSIGNMENT MARKETS

[1] JOB MATCHING WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND WORKERS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (02) : 437 - 450

[2] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[3] Gale D., 1960, THEORY LINEAR EC MOD

[4] CORE AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA OF A MARKET WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS [J]. NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS, 1976, 23 (02) : 321 - 337

[5] Kaneko M, 1976, INT J GAME THEORY, V5, P183

[6] KANEKO M, 1980, UNPUB J URBAN EC

[7] CORE OF AN N PERSON GAME [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1967, 35 (01) : 50 - &

[8] Shapley L., 1974, J MATH EC, V1, P23, DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0

[9] Shapley L. S., 1972, International Journal of Game Theory, V1, P111

[10] TELSER LG, 1972, COMPETITION COLLUSIO

[1] JOB MATCHING WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND WORKERS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (02) : 437 - 450

[2] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[3] Gale D., 1960, THEORY LINEAR EC MOD

[4] CORE AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA OF A MARKET WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS [J]. NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS, 1976, 23 (02) : 321 - 337

[5] Kaneko M, 1976, INT J GAME THEORY, V5, P183

[6] KANEKO M, 1980, UNPUB J URBAN EC

[7] CORE OF AN N PERSON GAME [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1967, 35 (01) : 50 - &

[8] Shapley L., 1974, J MATH EC, V1, P23, DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0

[9] Shapley L. S., 1972, International Journal of Game Theory, V1, P111

[10] TELSER LG, 1972, COMPETITION COLLUSIO