COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR AND PARTIAL OWNERSHIP OF RIVALS

被引：90

作者：

MALUEG, DA

机构：

[1] Tulane University, New Orelans

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1992年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(92)90045-Z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Others have shown in static models that increasing cross ownership among rival firms leads to more collusive outcomes. In contrast, this paper shows that if firms interact repeatedly, then increasing cross ownership may reduce the likelihood of collusion. A high level of cross ownership may even entail a lower likelihood of collusion than would no cross ownership.

引用

页码：27 / 34

页数：8

共 9 条

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