MULTITRADE BARGAINING

被引：1

作者：

BAE, H

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Dongguk University, Seoul, 100-715

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1991年 / 55卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(91)90068-F

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a model of multitrade bargaining games in which the object of bargaining can be traded repeatedly for two periods. The buyer's reservation price is private information and the seller makes all the offers. We distinguish two kinds of multitrade bargaining games-the contract bargaining game (CBG) in which one contract is made at most, and the repeated bargaining game (RBG) in which contracts can be made in each period. The two-period CBG and RBG are equivalent in the sense that for every reservation price of the buyer, each player's payoff and the sequence of trades made are identical in the equilibria of the two bargaining games. © 1991.

引用

页码：213 / 219

页数：7

共 7 条

[1] A CHARACTERIZATION OF SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES IN INFINITELY REPEATED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES [J].