EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AND EARNINGS MANIPULATION IN A MULTIPERIOD SETTING

被引：33

作者：

ELITZUR, RR ^{[1
]}

YAARI, V ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BAR ILAN UNIV,DEPT ECON,RAMAT GAN,ISRAEL

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1995年 / 26卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(94)00019-B

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study examines in a multi-period setting how trading of equity securities by managers and the awarding of such securities to managers affects earnings manipulation. The study explores the effect of an executive incentive compensation plan, comprised of bonus and equity holdings, on the reporting strategy of the manager under different degrees of market efficiency. The findings indicate that insider trading provides an informative signal about the direction of earnings manipulation. Furthermore, the results confirm that the choice of compensation scheme by owners tends to affect earnings manipulation.

引用

页码：201 / 219

页数：19

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