INCUMBENCY EFFECTS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

In this paper we examine two effects of incumbency. First, an incumbent may have an advantage in creating a favorable image in the eyes of the voters. Second, the incumbent may have to chose a position before the challenger; this second aspect of incumbency is modelled as Stackelberg leadership. In the model two candidates run for election by choosing a position in an ideological spectrum. Voters care about candidates' chosen positions as well as non-policy attributes of candidates, which we call charisma. Charismata are not known when candidates choose policy positions; they are only revealed on election day so that winning is not usually a certain prospect. Candidates care about the probability of winning but they also dislike compromising their own ideals. We find that the incumbent's equilibrium position is closer to his/her own ideal point than the equilibrium position of the game when moves are simultaneous. Also, for sufficiently large charismatic differences a natural leadership regime prevails: the candidate with the large charismatic advantage prefers being a leader to being a follower and the opponent prefers being a follower. If the difference in charismata is small both players prefer to be followers