A key substitution attack on SFLASH(v3)

被引:2
作者
Geiselmann, Willi [1 ]
Steinwandt, Rainer [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Karlsruhe, Fak Informat, Fasanengarten 5, D-76131 Karlsruhe, Germany
关键词
Digital signature; polynomial-based cryptography; key substitution;
D O I
10.1080/09720529.2005.10698026
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 [应用数学];
摘要
A practical key substitution attack on SFLASH(v3) is described: Given a valid (message, signature) pair (m, sigma) for some public key v(0), one can derive another public key v(1) (along with matching secret data) such that (m, sigma) is also valid for v(1). The computational effort needed for finding such a 'duplicate' key is comparable to the effort needed for ordinary key generation.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 141
页数:5
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