ASYMMETRIES OF INFORMATION AND LDC BORROWING WITH SOVEREIGN RISK

[1] ARNOTT R, 1982, 465 QUEENS U I EC RE

[2] DEBT WITH POTENTIAL REPUDIATION - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1981, 48 (02) : 289 - 309

[3] EATON J, 1981, PRINCETON STUDIES IN, V47

[4] FLEMING A, 1981, 484 WORLD BANK STAFF

[5] MORAL HAZARD IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (01) : 8 - 23

[6] HOPE NC, 1981, 488 WORLD BANK STAFF

[7] *INT MON FUND, 1980, OCC PAP, V1

[8] *INT MON FUND, 1981, OCC PAP, V3

[9] OBRIEN R, 1981, 482 WORLD BANK STAFF

[10] OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1974, 88 (01) : 44 - 62

[1] ARNOTT R, 1982, 465 QUEENS U I EC RE

[2] DEBT WITH POTENTIAL REPUDIATION - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1981, 48 (02) : 289 - 309

[3] EATON J, 1981, PRINCETON STUDIES IN, V47

[4] FLEMING A, 1981, 484 WORLD BANK STAFF

[5] MORAL HAZARD IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (01) : 8 - 23

[6] HOPE NC, 1981, 488 WORLD BANK STAFF

[7] *INT MON FUND, 1980, OCC PAP, V1

[8] *INT MON FUND, 1981, OCC PAP, V3

[9] OBRIEN R, 1981, 482 WORLD BANK STAFF

[10] OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1974, 88 (01) : 44 - 62