Quantum Attacks on Bitcoin, and How to Protect Against Them

被引:51
作者
Aggarwal, Divesh [1 ,2 ]
Brennen, Gavin [3 ]
Lee, Troy [4 ]
Santha, Miklos [2 ,5 ]
Tomamichel, Marco [6 ]
机构
[1] NUS, Dept Comp Sci, Singapore, Singapore
[2] NUS, Ctr Quantum Technol, Singapore, Singapore
[3] Macquarie Univ, N Ryde, NSW, Australia
[4] Univ Technol Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
[5] Univ Paris Diderot, CNRS, IRIF, Paris, France
[6] Univ Technol Sydney, Quantum Informat, Sydney, NSW, Australia
来源
LEDGER | 2018年 / 3卷
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.5195/LEDGER.2018.127
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
The key cryptographic protocols used to secure the internet and financial transactions of today are all susceptible to attack by the development of a sufficiently large quantum computer. One particular area at risk is cryptocurrencies, a market currently worth over 100 billion USD. We investigate the risk posed to Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, by attacks using quantum computers. We find that the proof-of-work used by Bitcoin is relatively resistant to substantial speedup by quantum computers in the next 10 years, mainly because specialized ASIC miners are extremely fast compared to the estimated clock speed of near-term quantum computers. On the other hand, the elliptic curve signature scheme used by Bitcoin is much more at risk, and could be completely broken by a quantum computer as early as 2027, by the most optimistic estimates. We analyze an alternative proof-of-work called Momentum, based on finding collisions in a hash function, that is even more resistant to speedup by a quantum computer. We also review the available post-quantum signature schemes to see which one would best meet the security and efficiency requirements of blockchain applications.
引用
收藏
页码:68 / 90
页数:23
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