EFFICIENT RENTS .1. RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR IN THE LONG-RUN

[1] BAUMOL WJ, 1972, CONTESTABLE MARKETS

[2] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) : 169 - 217

[3] CAPEN EC, 1971, J PETROLEUM TECH JUN, P641

[4] Chamberlin E., 1962, THEORY MONOPOLISTIC

[5] LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN RENT-SEEKING [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (01) : 89 - 94

[6] DEMSETZ, 1976, J L EC, V19, P371

[7] FOSTER E, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P171

[8] SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND REGULATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1975, 83 (04) : 807 - 827

[9] SELBY EB, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P189

[10] LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN RENT-SEEKING - A COMMENT [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (01) : 95 - 97

[1] BAUMOL WJ, 1972, CONTESTABLE MARKETS

[2] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) : 169 - 217

[3] CAPEN EC, 1971, J PETROLEUM TECH JUN, P641

[4] Chamberlin E., 1962, THEORY MONOPOLISTIC

[5] LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN RENT-SEEKING [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (01) : 89 - 94

[6] DEMSETZ, 1976, J L EC, V19, P371

[7] FOSTER E, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P171

[8] SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND REGULATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1975, 83 (04) : 807 - 827

[9] SELBY EB, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P189

[10] LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN RENT-SEEKING - A COMMENT [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (01) : 95 - 97