STRATEGIC INTERACTION AMONG NATIONS - NEGOTIABLE AND NONNEGOTIABLE TRADE BARRIERS

被引:62
作者
COPELAND, BR
机构
来源
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 1990年 / 23卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/135521
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Trade policy is modelled as a two-stage game between governments. Governments choose a negotiable trade barrier in the first stage of the game, which is co-operative. The level of this barrier is treated as a binding commitment in the second stage of the game where the non-negotiable trade barrier is chosen non-co-operatively. Hence governments choose trade barriers during negotiations with a view to influencing the equilibrium of the non-co-operative game to follow. This proves to be a convenient framework in which to analyse the idea that trade agreements contain loopholes which can be exploited by protectionist governments. -from Author
引用
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页码:84 / 108
页数:25
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