THE ASSURANCE PROBLEM IN A LABORATORY MARKET

[1] ANDREONI J, 1986, WHY FEE RIDE STRATEG

[2] BAGNOLI M, 1987, CAN PRIVATE PROVISIO

[3] ORGANIZING GROUPS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (04) : 1171 - 1185

[4] FUNDENBERG D, 1986, ECONOMETRICA, V54, P533

[5] GOETZE D, 1989, IN PRESS PUBLIC CHOI

[6] COMMUNICATION AND FREE-RIDING BEHAVIOR - THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1988, 26 (04) : 585 - 608

[7] GROUP-SIZE EFFECTS IN PUBLIC-GOODS PROVISION - THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS MECHANISM [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 103 (01) : 179 - 199

[8] DIVERGENT EVIDENCE ON FREE RIDING - AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (02) : 113 - 149

[9] ISAAC RM, 1985, J PUBLIC ECON, V26, P51

[10] ISAAC RM, 1987, SUBOPTIMALITY PUBLIC

[1] ANDREONI J, 1986, WHY FEE RIDE STRATEG

[2] BAGNOLI M, 1987, CAN PRIVATE PROVISIO

[3] ORGANIZING GROUPS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (04) : 1171 - 1185

[4] FUNDENBERG D, 1986, ECONOMETRICA, V54, P533

[5] GOETZE D, 1989, IN PRESS PUBLIC CHOI

[6] COMMUNICATION AND FREE-RIDING BEHAVIOR - THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1988, 26 (04) : 585 - 608

[7] GROUP-SIZE EFFECTS IN PUBLIC-GOODS PROVISION - THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS MECHANISM [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 103 (01) : 179 - 199

[8] DIVERGENT EVIDENCE ON FREE RIDING - AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (02) : 113 - 149

[9] ISAAC RM, 1985, J PUBLIC ECON, V26, P51

[10] ISAAC RM, 1987, SUBOPTIMALITY PUBLIC