A THEORY OF EXIT IN DUOPOLY

被引：167

作者：

FUDENBERG, D ^{[1
]}

TIROLE, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912845

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：943 / 960

页数：18

共 23 条

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