ELECTIONS AND INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION

[1] AMEMIYA T, 1981, J ECON LIT, V19, P1483

[2] [Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[3] REGULATION, REDISTRIBUTION, AND PUBLIC CHOICE [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1981, 37 (01) : 69 - 100

[4] ARANSON PH, 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[5] Arrow K.J., 1963, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI, V2nd

[6] CANDIDATE REPUTATIONS AND THE INCUMBENCY EFFECT [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 27 (01) : 47 - 67

[7] EXPOSITION OF A NEW THEORY ON THE MEASUREMENT OF RISK [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1954, 22 (01) : 23 - 36

[8] Coleman James S., 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[9] ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMA [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 15 (01) : 113 - 121

[10] DIRECTIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIA WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 24 (02) : 226 - 239

[1] AMEMIYA T, 1981, J ECON LIT, V19, P1483

[2] [Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[3] REGULATION, REDISTRIBUTION, AND PUBLIC CHOICE [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1981, 37 (01) : 69 - 100

[4] ARANSON PH, 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[5] Arrow K.J., 1963, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI, V2nd

[6] CANDIDATE REPUTATIONS AND THE INCUMBENCY EFFECT [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 27 (01) : 47 - 67

[7] EXPOSITION OF A NEW THEORY ON THE MEASUREMENT OF RISK [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1954, 22 (01) : 23 - 36

[8] Coleman James S., 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[9] ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMA [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 15 (01) : 113 - 121

[10] DIRECTIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIA WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 24 (02) : 226 - 239