A NONCOOPERATIVE VIEW OF COALITION-FORMATION AND THE CORE

被引：105

作者：

PERRY, M

RENY, PJ

机构：

[1] UNIV WESTERN ONTARIO,DEPT ECON,LONDON N6A 5C2,ONTARIO,CANADA

[2] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,CTR RATIONAL & INTERACT DECIS THEORY,IL-91905 JERUSALEM,ISRAEL

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1994年 / 62卷 / 04期

关键词：

CORE; IMPLEMENTATION; CONTINUOUS TIME;

D O I：

10.2307/2951733

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This idealized treatment of time ensures that there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated.

引用

页码：795 / 817

页数：23

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