EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR IN CRISIS BARGAINING GAMES

被引：76

作者：

BANKS, JS

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2111390

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：599 / 614

页数：16

共 20 条

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