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NONCOOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR BY A CARTEL AS AN ENTRY-DETERRING SIGNAL

被引：9
作者：
HARRINGTON, JE
机构：
来源：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1984年 / 15卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2555450
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：426 / 433
页数：8
相关论文
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