SOCIAL-SECURITY, MAJORITY-VOTING EQUILIBRIUM AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY

被引：22

作者：

HU, SC ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] SOCIAL SECUR ADM, WASHINGTON, DC 20201 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1982年 / 23卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2526437

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：269 / 287

页数：19

相关论文

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