SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS OF STOCHASTICALLY EQUIVALENT OBJECTS

被引：40

作者：

ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R

机构：

[1] Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1994年 / 44卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(93)00327-K

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that in sequential auctions of a large enough number of stochastically equivalent objects with bounded values, prices will on average have a downwards trend.

引用

页码：87 / 90

页数：4

共 6 条

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[3]

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[4] OPTIMAL AUCTIONS REVISITED [J].

ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R .

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[6]

Weber R.J., 1983, AUCTIONS BIDDING CON, P165

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