A MODEL OF CANDIDATE CONVERGENCE UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT VOTER PREFERENCES

被引:4
作者
GLAZER, A [1 ]
GROFMAN, B [1 ]
OWEN, G [1 ]
机构
[1] USN,POSTGRAD SCH,DEPT MATH,CODE 53,MONTEREY,CA 93943
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0895-7177(89)90418-4
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:471 / 478
页数:8
相关论文
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