SELLING TO RISK AVERSE BUYERS WITH UNOBSERVABLE TASTES

[1] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[2] MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) : 587 - 601

[3] GOLDMAN M, 1978, OPTIMAL NONLINEAR PR

[4] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[5] ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (06) : 1477 - 1499

[6] HARRIS M, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P347

[7] Holmstrom Bengt, 1977, THESIS STANFORD U

[8] COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE AUCTION PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (03) : 433 - 445

[9] MASKIN E, 1982, OPTIMAL AUCTIONS RIS

[10] MASKIN E, 1981, UCLA DP201

[1] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[2] MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) : 587 - 601

[3] GOLDMAN M, 1978, OPTIMAL NONLINEAR PR

[4] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[5] ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (06) : 1477 - 1499

[6] HARRIS M, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P347

[7] Holmstrom Bengt, 1977, THESIS STANFORD U

[8] COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE AUCTION PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (03) : 433 - 445

[9] MASKIN E, 1982, OPTIMAL AUCTIONS RIS

[10] MASKIN E, 1981, UCLA DP201