WILL HOMEOWNERS IMPOSE PROPERTY TAXES

被引:11
作者
HENDERSON, JV
机构
关键词
PROPERTY TAXATION; LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS; SHAREHOLDER MODELS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes whether homeowners will use property taxes, as opposed to other revenue instruments, to finance local public services. The paper assumes homeowners recognize the impact of the outcomes of their voting for public services on their property values. Homeowners are modelled as endogenous in number in each community; and within each community they correspond to the ex post voter-residents of a community. Under these conditions, in a Nash equilibrium among imperfectly competitive communities, homeowners do not choose to finance with property taxes. The paper also integrates the two divergent models of community decision-making-the utility-maximizing voter model and the profit-maximizing corporation model.
引用
收藏
页码:153 / 181
页数:29
相关论文
共 32 条
[1]   ELEMENTARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY OF EXPENDITURES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS [J].
BARR, JL ;
DAVIS, OA .
SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1966, 33 (02) :149-165
[2]  
BOADWAY R, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P846
[3]   A NOTE ON THE MARKET PROVISION OF CLUB GOODS [J].
BOADWAY, R .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1980, 13 (01) :131-137
[4]  
BRUECKNER JK, 1986, NATL TAX J, V39, P49
[5]   PROPERTY VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND PUBLIC-SECTOR EFFICIENCY [J].
BRUECKNER, JK .
JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01) :1-15
[6]  
COURANT PN, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P806
[7]   VOTING EQUILIBRIA WITH MARKET-BASED ASSESSMENTS [J].
EDELSON, NM .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1976, 5 (3-4) :269-284
[8]  
ELLICKSON B, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P334
[9]   PROFIT-MAXIMIZING COMMUNITIES AND THE THEORY OF LOCAL PUBLIC-EXPENDITURES - COMMENT [J].
EPPLE, D ;
ZELENITZ, A .
JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 1984, 16 (02) :149-157
[10]   THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITION AMONG JURISDICTIONS - DOES TIEBOUT NEED POLITICS [J].
EPPLE, D ;
ZELENITZ, A .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (06) :1197-1217