EQUILIBRIUM MECHANISMS IN A DECENTRALIZED MARKET

被引：18

作者：

PETERS, M

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1994年 / 64卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1994.1074

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A large decentralized market where buyers have private information about the idiosyncratic value of an exchange opportunity with a seller is studied. The seller offers the buyer a contract or mechanism as soon as he is matched. It is shown that if the discount factor is high enough, there will be a symmetric market equilibrium in which all sellers offer simple fixed price mechanisms. Along the equilibrium path these mechanisms will be ex ante inefficient. Prices will be too high and the extent of search by buyers too low. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：390 / 423

页数：34

共 13 条

[1]

BESTER H, 1987, REV ECON STUD, V55, P17

[2] MODEL OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT [J].