HOW HARD IS IT TO CONTROL AN ELECTION

被引：217

作者：

BARTHOLDI, JJ

TOVEY, CA

TRICK, MA

机构：

[1] GEORGIA INST TECHNOL,COLL COMP,ATLANTA,GA 30332

[2] CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV,PITTSBURGH,PA 15213

来源：

MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING | 1992年 / 16卷 / 8-9期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0895-7177(92)90085-Y

中图分类号：

TP39 [计算机的应用];

学科分类号：

081203 ; 0835 ;

摘要：

Some voting schemes that are in principle susceptible to control are nevertheless resistant in practice due to excessive computational costs; others are vulnerable. We illustrate this in detail for plurality voting and for Condorcet voting.

引用

页码：27 / 40

页数：14

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