POLITICAL INFLUENCE MOTIVES AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN TARIFFS AND QUOTAS

被引:40
作者
CASSING, JH
HILLMAN, AL
机构
[1] BAR ILAN UNIV,IL-52100 RAMAT GAN,ISRAEL
[2] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-1996(85)90036-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:279 / 290
页数:12
相关论文
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