THEORY AND BEHAVIOR OF MULTIPLE UNIT DISCRIMINATIVE AUCTIONS

[1] CHEW SH, UNPUB ECONOMETRICA

[2] CHEW SH, 1982, WEIGHTED UTILITY THE

[3] INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1980, 18 (01) : 1 - 22

[4] AUCTION MARKET THEORY OF HETEROGENEOUS BIDDERS [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1982, 9 (04) : 319 - 325

[5] TESTS OF A HETEROGENEOUS BIDDERS THEORY OF 1ST PRICE AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1983, 12 (3-4) : 207 - 212

[6] A TEST THAT DISCRIMINATES BETWEEN 2 MODELS OF THE DUTCH-1ST AUCTION NON-ISOMORPHISM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1983, 4 (2-3) : 205 - 219

[7] COX JC, 1984, RES EXPT EC, V3

[8] COX JC, 1983, EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING

[9] DEGROOT MH, 1975, PROBABILITY STATISTI

[10] ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (06) : 1477 - 1499

[1] CHEW SH, UNPUB ECONOMETRICA

[2] CHEW SH, 1982, WEIGHTED UTILITY THE

[3] INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1980, 18 (01) : 1 - 22

[4] AUCTION MARKET THEORY OF HETEROGENEOUS BIDDERS [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1982, 9 (04) : 319 - 325

[5] TESTS OF A HETEROGENEOUS BIDDERS THEORY OF 1ST PRICE AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1983, 12 (3-4) : 207 - 212

[6] A TEST THAT DISCRIMINATES BETWEEN 2 MODELS OF THE DUTCH-1ST AUCTION NON-ISOMORPHISM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1983, 4 (2-3) : 205 - 219

[7] COX JC, 1984, RES EXPT EC, V3

[8] COX JC, 1983, EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING

[9] DEGROOT MH, 1975, PROBABILITY STATISTI

[10] ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (06) : 1477 - 1499